Revision Date: 03/21/02
During this time period the 2/94th took part in
Counteroffensive Phase IV
(04-02-68 to 06-30-68)
Description of
Counteroffensive, Phase IV
During this period friendly forces conducted a number of battalion-size attritional operations against the enemy.
Operations
PEGASUS-Lam Son 207 relieved the Khe Sanh Combat Base on 5 April and thereby
opened Route 9 for the first time since August 1967. This operation not only
severely restricted the North Vietnamese Army's use of western Quang Tri
Province but also inflicted casualties on the remnants of two North Vietnamese
divisions withdrawing from the area. This success was followed by a singular
allied spoiling operation in the A Shau Valley, Operation DELAWARE-Lam Son.
These two operations prevented the enemy from further attacking I Corps
Tactical Zone population centers and forced him to shift his pressure to the
III Corps Tactical Zone.
During the period 5-12 May
1968 the Viet Cong launched an offensive with Saigon as the primary objective.
Friendly forces defended the city with great determination. Consequently Saigon
was never in danger of being overrun. Small Viet Cong units that did manage to
get into the outskirts were fragmented and driven out with great loss of enemy
life. By the end of June 1968 friendly forces had decisively blunted the
enemy's attacks, inflicted very heavy casualties, and hindered his ability to
attack urban areas throughout the Republic of Vietnam. The enemy was forced to
withdraw to his sanctuaries.
The strength of the U.S. Army
in Vietnam reaches a peak of nearly 360,000 men during this period. (End of description)
The 2/94th supported two battalions of the 4th Marine Regiment
that were engaged in Operation SCOTLAND II. Initiated on 15 April 1968, this
multi-battalion search and clear operation was centered in and a round the Khe
Sanh combat base. (4th Marine Battalions are unknown at his time)
After many weeks of siege,
the enemy was finally driven back from Khe Sanh. The defense cost a great many American lives, but the enemy was
hit even harder. The next few months
would see a substantial drop in enemy activity as he regrouped and avoided
confrontation in order to build up his forces.
The successful defense of Khe Sanh was a significant page in the Vietnam
chronicle. While the outpost itself
would later be abandon, the success proved that the determined US Forces would
not accept defeat in Vietnam. Though
militarily superior, the US Forces had been sustaining heavy causalities as a
result of the excellently deployed guerrilla forces of the VC and NVA. There was growing opinion that the guerrilla
force could never be overcome. Though
the war was far from over, Charlie’s reputation as an incredible fighter was
beginning to suffer.
During these artillery battles the 2/94th suffered causalities from all batteries on Carroll. From a Battalion Surgeon that was with 3rd Battalion 9th Marines information indicates there were casualties in the 2/94th crews at the Rockpile as well.
Final
Statistics for the Defense of Khe Sanh
U.S. & Allied Casualties
730 Americans Killed in Action
2,642 Americans Wounded in Action
7 Americans Missing in Action
229 South Vietnamese ARVN Killed in Action
436 South Vietnamese ARVN Wounded in Action
The enemy had retreated so completely from the area that rocket attacks
were weeks apart rather than just hours as they had been.
Most significant was the fact B Battery displaced to Ca Lu on 8 June 1968
without incident.
A year previous they convoyed to
Ca Lu under heavy security in an attempt to reach Khe Sanh. Due to enemy ambushes the plan was canceled
and battery returned to base camp.
The majority of the Battalion missions during this time were counter battery or suppression fires. Though enemy activity had lessened, there was still sufficient contact capable of producing causalities.
On 9 April 1968, Brigadier General Glick, Deputy Commander of the 3rd Marine Division, visited C Battery Gun #3 and fired one round while the gun was engaged in a fire mission.
On 14 April 1968, C Battery received two 8-inch tubes and at that time two 175 tubes were removed, making the Battery combined 175mm and 8-inch.
On 15 April 1968, Operation Pegasus, Long Sam II, was concluded.
On 15 April 1968, A/8/4 departed
the Rockpile and returned to OPCON of the 4th Artillery. A/8/4 had been under operational control
since 16 January 1968.
On 15 April 1968, B/2/94 displaced from Carroll to the Rockpile.
B Battery displaced to
Thon Son Lam (Rockpile) and received only four rocket attacks, without any
damage sustained. The only damage was
cause by an accidental fire, which destroyed gun 4, and injured nine men. One cannoneer received shrapnel wound to the
cheek and several Marines were treated for smoke inhalation. The accident
happened when the crew had to fire one gun over the top of another. There was a
fireball and that blew the projectile and powder pit of the destroyed gun
section. That gun crew ended up with a 81mm mortar for a while. (See FDC
Officer account below.)
On 15 April 1968, C Battery converted two 175’s to 8 inch. These 8-inch guns were used primarily to destroy bunker complexes north of JJ Carroll. (See FDC Officer account below.)
8-inch on Carroll
(This is thought to be one of the first conversions completed on
Carroll described above and below)
Account from Captain Tom Jones, Battalion FDC Officer: We returned the two eight inch tubes after a while. With them we had shot north beyond Dong Ha Mountain. Once we had two USMC aerial observers adjusting on a 14.7mm AA gun sited atop a ridge in a hole. Round three occupied the hole with the AA gun. Probably ruined their whole day. We shot a precision mission to the southwest at a bunker. The mission was adjusted from atop the Battalion FDC bunker. The eight inch tubes were returned and we had all twelve 175 tubes for the big shoot in the DMZ in late June. We always had A/8/4 attached. They stayed at the Rock Pile. We got another 8/4 Battery for the DMZ shoot.
Five
batteries was too much coordination for Battalion. 4 rounds converged sheaf
with ten minutes between fire missions. That meant shooting rounds at 0, 2, 4, 6
minutes on the schedule of fires with four minutes left to relay in many cases
and get data to the guns. In addition, gun crews were usually at about half
strength due to R&R, guard duty and not assigned up to full strength. It
was too much for too few.
The first night got us several hours behind. The DMZ shoot included 60 Arc Lites. Each of the first two days, 300 TPQ's plus Marine Artillery and 1/40 Artillery. After two days naval gunfire came in. They stayed out until some coastal artillery was destroyed. This operation was to relieve pressure on Dong Ha logistical base. We were OPCON to the First Cavalry Division Artillery for Operation Pegasus.
The Cavalry FSC commended us several times because we
were laid and ready to fire quicker than his Division Artillery. We did a TOT for the Cavalry. The FSC called
for times of flight. Average Cavalry
was 30 seconds. When he got to Hungarian (2/94th) and 180 seconds
time of flight, all he could do was croak "Hungarian Fire". We may have been late. One afternoon during
Pegasus, either Blue Max or Black Widow from the Cavalry Division Artillery
shot us into Long Vei Special Forces Camp at the NVA. This AO shot us until he
called it quits due to only gas fumes left in his fuel tank. We fired when the
Marines caught a NVA division trying to slip south. All available artillery fired at 100-meter intervals along a line
- one round per minute and moving from spot to spot.
There is a Marine authored
book on this action that doesn't mention the artillery very much. A Marine
captain and fraternity brother of mine at Auburn got a MH there saving a sister
line company and finishing the action on a stretcher with five wounds. The
artillery raids and the big blow up at the Rock Pile occurred while I was in
Conus on emergency leave. The DMZ shoot was after I got back and I was leaving
C battery.
At the Rock Pile a 175 firing
adjustment let loose a sheet of flame from the muzzle. This flame ignited a
powder charge laying on a flank piece. This powder charge cooked off the round
rammed in the tube. The explosion flipped the gun and set off the ammunition
bunkers. This raised havoc with the Marine Artillery sited inside the 175
Battery. A bad powder lot caused the excessive muzzle blast. This is what I was
told later.
I remember tubes were changed
at 300 rounds and a new breechblock every two tubes. Standard velocity was
914.4 m/s. Max range was 32,000 M. One night a Marine had us at 34,000 shooting
before he gave us a drop 800. Met was
very stable at Carroll.
We took incoming about every
other day. It was 122 rockets and 130mm guns. A major problem was a US pack 75
located on the face of Dong Ha Mountain. His trajectory was so flat that he did
not break both beams of the Q4 radar. It could only hit A Battery. Captain Richard
Erickson told me later that that when the Marines took Dong Ha Mountain, they
found two 75's tunneled in from the backside with only muzzle holes to fire
through. A 75 round wounded Captain Jablonski in the calf on 2 May 1967and lead
to his death the next day.
(End of account.)
Account from Battalion FDC Officer, Captain Tom Jones regarding Major Fleming and an unknown member of A Battery: "Major Fleming came in one afternoon. He said he had dropped into A Batteries latrine to get rid of some coffee. Seems a young troop about to rotate was sitting there almost dying of constipation. The latrine was well padded with 175 powder canisters. After Major Fleming completed his task and walked a ways off, a 75mm round landed right outside the latrine. The young fellow was unhurt.
We figured that was the quickest conversion from constipation
to diarrhea in history. (End of account)
Note from Chronicler: I would imagine we all could relate to that scenario some.
Notes and discussion from 1 Feb 1968 to 30 Apr 68, 6th
Battalion
Operational Report
During the period
the Battalion the mission remained the same.
Supporting the 12th Marine Regiment, direct support for the 3rd
Marine Recon patrols, and reinforcing the 13th Marine Artillery
fires at Khe Sanh. Mission was changed
on 31 March 1968 to supporting the 1st Air Cavalry Artillery with
priority fire to the 1st Cavalry.
That mission was cancelled as of 15 March 1968, which concluded
Operation Pegasus II.
The
Battalion suffered losses and wounded during the reporting period, with the
heaviest losses in February.
During this
quarter 4,855 missions were accomplished with an expenditure of 28,052 rounds
and 49 gun tubes.
Infusion of
4 Lieutenants and 3 Captains has eliminated the rotational problem in
September.
Tube
instability: After firing a relatively
few (sometimes less than 50) rounds at charge 3, definite lateral “whipping”
effect of the tube may be observed.
Loosening of
the final drive mounting bolts and of the traversing assembly bolts causes this
effect. In order to correct this
problem, it is necessary to remove the traversing drive assembly and to tighten
the mounting bolts. This task takes
approximately one hour.
It is highly
recommend that the final drive bolts be tightened once per week of sooner if
tube “whipping” is detected.
Marking of
clothing: The importance of marking of
individual items cannot be over emphasized for identification.
Cracking
spades on the 175: The spades have been
cracking with disturbing regularity on the especially when firing charge
3. Some have been welded in excess of
30 times. The 8-inch does not display
this problem. It is concluded that the
spade on the 175 is simply not strong enough to sustain heavy rates of fire,
using charge 3. Too little strength in
the interest of saving weight. It is
recommended a heavier stronger spade be developed for the 175mm gun.
The
elevation the traversing planetary carriers break too often: The carrier and the sun gear cause no
problem on the 8-inch. They do break on
a regular basis on the 175. Replacement
parts have been difficult to obtain and have caused considerable down
time. 12 carriers replaced during this
reporting period. It is recommended
that the subject parts be strengthened in future manufacture and that
replacement be stocked in quantity at direct support level to minimize down
time.
Casualties during this period:
Killed in Action – 5 Private First Class James Allen Lowery; A Battery, from Port Orford, Oregon. Private First Class Kenneth Eugene Hornbaker; Headquarters Battery, from Mercersburg, Pennsylvania. Specialist Arkie Wright Jr.; Headquarters Battery, from Williamsburg, Ohio. Specialist Kenneth John Greene; from Jersey City, New Jersey.
Wounded in
Action – 30 (Captain Dominguez,
Lieutenant Sandeen, Captain Durkin, Sergeant First
Class Jones, Staff Sergeant
Brum, Corporal Robinson, Private First Class Hillis, Private First Class Willard) (22 Not known at this time)
End of notes and discussion, 6th
Battalion
Operational Report
On 2 and 4
May 1968, incoming artillery wounded three cannoneers from C Battery. Private First Class Thomas Schofield, C Battery, from
Layton, Utah was killed in the attack of May 2 1968.
Private First Class Hatfield and Private Searle were the two C Battery cannoneers injured by incoming artillery
and med-evaced.
Also wounded in the attack on May 2 1968 was Captain Edmond Jablonsky, Headquarters Battery, from Pasadena, Texas. Captain Jablonsky was Medevac'd but died as a result of his wounds on 3 May 1968. He was the first officer killed in the Battalion since the unit’s reactivation.
Remembrance from Captain Tom Jones, one of the 2/94th officers that served
with Captain Jablonsky
- Lieutenant Colonel Kamstra would tell him not to go out every time his crew
had to recover vehicles shot up on convoy. Captain Jablonsky, Ed, went anyway.
He told Lieutenant Colonel Kamstra that if I send my men out then I
am going also.
On 30 May 1968, A Battery displaced from Carroll to LZ Hawk (XD895405) to
support Operation Drum Fire II. A
Battery would return to Carroll on 2 June 1968.
In the month of June the M14 rifles were exchanged for the new M16 rifles
throughout the Battalion. Instructions
were given on the cleaning and maintenance of the new weapon.
On 2 June 1968, A Battery returned to JJ Carroll from LZ Hawk.
On 3 June 1968, Private First Class Hatfield of C Battery returned from the hospital. He returned to his duties as a cannoneer.
On 8 June 1968, B
Battery displaced from the Rockpile to Ca Lu (YD010455) reinforcing fires of
the 12th Marine Artillery providing support for the 3rd
Marine elements in the Khe Sanh area.
On 12 June 1968,
two new quarter ton trucks were received to replace the two that were
destroyed.
On 17 June 1968, Lieutenant Colonel Alan A. Bristor accepted the Battalion colors in a
ceremony marking his assumption of command.
Major General Steadwell Deputy Commander, 3rd Marine
Amphibious Force was present for the occasion.
From 1967 to 1968 the ammo dump at Dong Ha, where the 2/94th Service Battery
resided, was hit at least three times and could be readily seen from Carroll
some 18 miles away.
On 21 June to 27 June 1968, B Battery occupied LZ Hawk, received only
light scattered rocket attacks. While
at LZ Hawk the battery reinforced the fire of the 12th Marine
Artillery and fired approximately 600 rounds in support of Task Force Hotel
during Operation Scotland II, South.
On 27 June 1968, B Battery displaced from LZ Hawk to Camp Carroll to prepare for Operation Thor.
On 30 June 1968, Private First Class Gerald Leroy Walters of C Battery was killed by incoming artillery. Private First Class Walters was from Culbertson, Texas. During the same attack, Private First Class Bruce of C Battery was wounded and Medevac'd.
C
Battery Status
Battery Commander
1 April to 30 June 1968, Captain William Trinidad Dominguez
XO
1 April to 27 April 1968, Lieutenant Robert A. Delap
27 April to 30
June 1968, Lieutenant William Wilson.
Asst XO
1April to 30 June 1968,
Lieutenant Jeffrey P.
Newton.
Forward Observer
1 April to 5 May 1968, Lieutenant Stephen Desold
1 April 30 June 1968, Lieutenant Kenneth K. Gross
5 May to 4 June 1968, Lieutenant John K. Bucher
4 June to 30 June 1968, Lieutenant Ronald Keane.
First Sergeant
1 April to 30 June 1968, First
Sergeant Jack E. Hobgood.
The Battery is in the process of shifting to defense of
different areas for support necessary for protection for ground gaining forces
and insure proper defense for them. A
program of strengthening bunkers and reinforcing gun pads and powder and
projectile pits have been our main objectives.
To conclude, an overall effort has been made to insure the protection
and well being of our personnel in an adequate manner.
Signed by Capt,
Arty, Commanding William Trinidad Dominguez
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04-01-68)
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