2nd Campaign
Revision Date: 03/21/02
During this time period the 2/94th took part in
Counteroffensive, Phase III
(06-01-67 to 01-29-68)
Description of Counteroffensive, Phase III
The conflict in South Vietnam
remains basically unchanged. As Operation JUNCTION CITY ended, elements of the
U.S. 1st and 25th Infantry Divisions, the 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment, and the
forces of the Army of the Republic of Vietnam swung back toward Saigon to
conduct another clearing operation, MANHATTAN. This took place in the Long
Nguyen base area just north of the previously cleared "Iron
Triangle."
South Vietnamese Armed Forces became more active and capable under U.S. advisors. During the year the Vietnamese Special Forces assumed responsibility for several Special Forces camps and for the CIDG companies manning them. In each case all of the U.S. advisors withdrew, leaving the Vietnamese in full command.
With an increased delegation
of responsibility to them, the South Vietnamese conducted major operations
during 1967, and, in spite of VC attempts to avoid battle, achieved a number of
contacts.
Despite the success of U.S.
and South Vietnamese Army operations, there were indications in the fall of
1967 of another enemy build-up, particularly in areas close to Laos and
Cambodia. In late October, the VC struck again at the Special Forces Camp at
Loc Ninh. Fortunately Vietnamese reinforcements saved the camp. At the same
time, approximately 12,000 VC troops converged on a Special Forces camp at Dak
To. This camp was located in northern Kontum Province, where the borders of
Laos, Cambodia, and South Vietnam meet. In response to this potential threat,
the U.S. and South Vietnam committed a total of sixteen battalions to the
region to counter a disturbing enemy resurgence at Kontum and Loc Ninh. (End of description)
From 1 May 1967 to 12 June 1967 one firing battery was positioned at Gio Linh. They were 81 separate attacks by enemy mortar, rocket, and artillery. Equipment losses were light but there has been 1 KIA and 26 WIA’s during the period at Gio Linh.
The 2/94th KIA at Gio Linh on 3 June 1967 was Specialist Duncan Hartwell Fleming; Service Battery, from Stamford, Connecticut.
On 3 June 1967, the firing elements of C Battery displaced 3,400 meters
southeast to the firing position and returned the same day.
On 6 June 1967, the firing elements of the C Battery displaced to the
firing position at Truc Khe and returned the same day.
On 11 June 1967, B Battery platoon displaced from Carroll to Ca Lu to
support a Marine Recon patrol near the Laotian border. B Battery platoon returned the same day.
On 12 June 1967, C Battery displaced to the firing position at Truc Khe. Movement was to allow C Battery to fire from a safer environment. Prior to this movement they had moved four times between Gio Linh and Truc Khe for daytime firing.
Account from Lieutenant Greg Smith, FDO with C Battery: During the day trips to that position from Gio Linh, I believe the fire direction center remained at Gio Linh and transmitted fire missions over land line. There was wire run from Dong Ha to Gio Linh however it was cut every night. A standard sight every morning was the commo section wire trucks out driving south fixing the land lines along route 1 down to Dong Ha while the service battery ammo trucks drove past them going north to Gio Linh.
While C Battery occupied the Truc Khe location, one night in the summer of '67, the main base at Dong Ha to the south came under attack by rockets and mortars. After hearing some noise from the village directly across the road (Highway 1), I stepped out of the FDC bunker and saw rockets being launched out of the village toward Dong Ha. I couldn't believe it! And we were right across the road! Of course being a village it was a no fire zone on all my map overlays and also since there was a limited number of rockets launched, we did not respond. However, the next day we made an attempt to communicate with leaders in the village to indicate that if we ever took any incoming from the village we would definitely fire back. So...to emphasize our intent, at sun down we re-laid Gun 1 (nearest to the road and right across from the village) on an azimuth dead center to the village and then lowered the tube into 'direct fire' position. All those people went to sleep that night with a 35 foot long 175 tube pointed directly at the middle of their village from right across the road.
"We never got hit there but left abruptly one day after getting a coded message over the radio the said simply "CSMO ASAP" and Captain McCord sent me with the guns down the road to Dong Ha. (End of account)
On 12 June 1967, D Battery displaced from Dong Ha to Camp Carroll.
On 13 June 1967, B Battery platoon displaced to the Rockpile to provide
support for the 26th Marine Regiment operating near the Laotian
border. B Battery platoon returned to
Carroll 17 July 1967.
On 17 June 1967, Lieutenant Terry G. Lee was assigned to Battery B
6th Bn 27th Arty (D Battery 2/94th).
The Battalion celebrated their first anniversary since activation with organization day activities in June of 1967. A steak fry was held and awards were presented to the many men who had displayed their courage and fortitude during the past nine months in Vietnam.
Account from a Marine that was a visitor to Carroll during 67: In June 1967, my outfit, Kilo Company of the 3rd Battalion 26th
Marines traveled by truck convoy from Phu Bai to Khe Sanh. We stopped off at
Camp Carroll for the night. I will never forget how happy I was to be able to
spend the night - to be able to sleep all night - while Carroll's Marines
manned the perimeter. We felt like guests. Well, it was around midnight, and I
was fast asleep lying out in the open approximately 20 yards, as I recall, from
a 175 mm long gun. It received a fire mission and fired off a round.
BOOM!!
The noise and concussion lifted me off the ground and scared the crap out of
me. My only thought was WOW! Get Some!
Anyway,
we headed out the next morning for Khe Sanh where at that time things were
relatively quiet. We remained there for approximately 1 1/2 months then headed
down to Con Thien in August 1967.
You can't imagine how much we Marines on Hill 861 appreciated your 2/94th Arty support. Frankly, the closer to our lines your rounds hit the better I liked it. That meant you were killing close-to-the-perimeter gooks. (End of account.)
On 24 June 1967, a former member of the Original Battalion was killed in action while serving with the 3/18th Artillery. Former member was Specialist Jerry Lyne Steed from Gainesville, Texas.
On 30 June 1967, C Battery was under daily hostile artillery and mortar
attacks while at Gio Linh. The Battery
has fired 26,000 rounds. The Battery
has shot out 42 tubes.
Status of Personnel of C Battery:
Battery Commander, Captain Chancey K. McCord; XO is Lieutenant Andrew
Tenis; FDC is Lieutenant Gregory T. Smith; and First Sergeant is
Edward E. Bryan.
The battery demonstrated its ability to move and perform under combat
conditions and hostile fire and this was especially true during the period that
the battery was in Gio Linh.
Signed by Captain, Arty, Commanding,
Chancey K. McCord
Service Battery personnel ammunition section, once again during this
period distinguished their unit by maintaining ammunition resupply of 100 to
300 rounds per day. The enemy had begun
shelling Gio Linh during the daylight hours and the ammunition section started
out each day with the certain knowledge that they would be off-loading under
fire.
Service
Battery sustained several injuries and on 3 June 1967, Specialist Duncan Fleming
from Stamford Connecticut was killed in action and Private First Class Honkon lost an arm and leg while off
loading ammunition.
As the activity increased in the Northern I Corps area the bulk of the
Third Marine Division was moved to the I Corps area. The 2/94th supplied
artillery support for Vietnamese Army as well as the Marines in their
operations and perimeters around the DMZ.
The 2/94th supplied Forward Observers and Radio Operators to
the South Vietnamese Army. One combined major operation during this time was
called HASTINGS.
Ground forces were denied authority to conduct reconnaissance
patrols in the northern portion of the DMZ and inside North Vietnam by the US
Government. Confined to South
Vietnamese territory U.S. ground forces had to fight a war of attrition against
the enemy, relying on body counts as one standard indicator for measuring
successful progress for winning the war.
This set the rules of the war as decreed by Washington politics.
Vietnamese Army and other Marine Corps units conducted Operation HASTINGS against enemy infiltrators across the DMZ.
On 1 July 1967, C Battery was at Truc Khe with the Battery HQ and Ammo
Sections located at base camp at Dong Ha.
On 4 July 1967, Dong Ha received 7 rounds of 122mm artillery with none landing in the C Battery Base Camp area.
On 6 July 1967 the 175 Guns from Carroll fired missions to stop an all out attack against the Marine base at Con Thien. Account below from FO Lieutenant Doug Beard.
Con Thien was being defended by US Marines. Present at that time during Operation Buffalo in that area were 1st Battalion 9th Marines, A-B-C-D-and H&S Company; 3rd Battalion 9th Marines, M-I-L-K- H&S Company- H Company Second Battalion 9th Marines (OPCON); Battalion Landing Team Alpha (1/3) First Battalion Third Marines, A-B-C-D-and H&S Company; Battalion Landing Team Bravo (2/3) Second Battalion Third Marines, E-F-G-H-and H&S Company. In addition, a Recon unit from 3rd Marine Recon Battalion was present.
Account from Lieutenant Doug Beard, FO of B Battery: On July 6th, 67 (according to my Log Book) I dropped the biggest fire mission you ever had in your lap. I was flying RV over Con Thien when that base came under a large coordinated artillery and ground attack.
From my perch, I could see the muzzle flashes of seven different enemy artillery batteries firing on Con Thien. They were about six miles north of Con Thien (across the border) located on the southern and eastern shores of what we "flyboys" called the Finger Lakes. While my pilot worked TAC air on the enemy troops attacking, I went to work on the artillery positions.
After a few attempts to call the mission to 12th Regiment FDC failed (due to radio jamming), I switched to our Battalion FDC. They had trouble getting Save-A-Plane clearance and when I started screaming to give me rounds in adjustment without clearance, because I had a clear line of sight from JJ Carroll to target and those 7 enemy batteries were more a threat to our planes, and they had not gotten clearance to fire. Either clearance came through, or somebody back there had the 'kahonnies' to fire without, but I got rounds in adjustment.
As soon as you guys started FFE, those batteries shut down (with secondaries) and the Marines on the ground could concentrate on repelling the attack. That was Classic Artillery Dueling at its finest, and you guys done good. (End of account)
On 6 - 8 July 1967, Dong Ha received 20 rounds of 122mm artillery with
none landing in the C Battery Base Camp area.
On 10 July 1967, Dong Ha received 60 plus rounds of 122mm artillery with
none landing in the C Battery Base Camp area.
On 14 July 1967,
Lieutenant Colonel Trefry departed to go down to Dong Ha to pick up the new
Battalion Commander,
Lieutenant Colonel Kamstra.
On 14 July 1967, C Battery displaced from Truc Khe to Dong Ha.
On 17 July 1967, C firing battery displaced from Truc Khe to Battery Base
Camp at Dong Ha.
On 17 July 1967 at 1445 hours, one gun from B Battery returned to Carroll
from the Rockpile.
On 17 July 1967 at 0930 hours, B Battery departed Carroll for Khe
Sanh. At 1520 hours, B Battery returned
Carroll. 3rd Marine convoy
turned around because of excessive enemy contact at 970432.
On 26 July 1967 a change of command ceremony was held. Lieutenant Colonel Robert H. Kamstra accepted the Battalion colors from Lieutenant Colonel Richard G. Trefry. Lieutenant Colonel Trefry, who had seen the Battalion through activation, training, overseas transport and the first months in combat was reassigned to Headquarters, First Field Force Vietnam.
The new Battalion commander would see the Battalion continue to receive constant enemy contact by mortar and artillery attacks, and would see the individual batteries and separate platoons displace to various locations to fire in support of several operations at once.
On 26-28 July 1967, Dong Ha received 21 rounds of 122mm artillery with
none landing in the C Battery Base Camp area.
On 29 July 1967, A Battery displaced from Chu Lai to vicinity of Hue (YD19096). A Battery had been attached to the 3rd Battalion 18th Artillery and now was assigned to 1st Field Artillery Group (US Marine Corps).
A Battery is now to provide support for the
3rd Marine Division in the Hue - Phu Bai area of operation. From this location A Battery can range from
the South China Sea northeast of Hue to the Laotian border in the west. It can also fire throughout the majority of
the A Shau Valley. A Battery returned
to ADCON of the 2/94th.
On 30 July 1967, General Johnson, Army Chief of Staff, paid a visit to
the Battalion.
By 30 July 1967 the Battalion had fired 84,940 rounds in RVN, out of which 47,425 nearly half of the total, had been fired into North Vietnam as part of Operation High Rise. Most of the missions fired into North Vietnam and the DMZ were unobserved and it was therefore difficult to obtain surveillance or battle damage assessments. The only way an artilleryman gets to know what effects for his hard work is having is by having surveillance, and the Battalion had an excellent record in those few missions that were observed. Observers confirmed 240 enemy KIA and another 230 probable, 79 secondary explosions, 7 artillery pieces destroyed and 7 damaged, 40 bunkers destroyed and a long list of other targets destroyed or damaged.
Notes and discussion from 1 May 1967 to 31 July 1967, 3rd Battalion Operational Report
Mission assignments: Provide GS for the 3rd Marine Division. Direct support for the patrols of the 3rd Marine Recon Battalion is provided as directed by the 12th Marine Regiment. In addition, supporting fires for Khe Sanh Special Forces camp can be provided as required. A Battery now provides GS for the 3rd Marine Division in the vicinity of Hue and Phu Bai area.
From 25 February
1967 to present the Battalion has fired continuously for Operation High Rise.
From 1 June
1967 to 2 July 1967 the Battalion has fired continuously for Operation
Cimarron.
From 2 July 1967 to 14 July 1967 the Battalion has
fired continuously for Operation Buffalo.
From 14 July
1967 to 16 July 1967 the Battalion has fired continuously for Operation Hickory
II.
From 16 July
1967 to present the Battalion has fired continuously for Operation Kingfisher.
From 17 July
1967 to present the Battalion has fired continuously for Operation Ardmore (Khe
Sanh).
Weather for
this period has been dry. Southwest
winds at 16 knots accompanied by large amounts of blowing dust. This has made for unfavorable conditions in
the billet and work areas as well as demanded considerable maintenance on
engines operating with air cleaners.
Observation of chronicler: (I remember
looking from Dong Ha towards Carroll and all you could see was a high
flat-topped area enveloped with a huge red cloud.)
Ground
observations for forward observers continue to be a problem with the heavy
vegetation and mountainous terrain.
Weather
conditions have been good for aerial observations.
The met
section continues to operate satisfactorily.
During this
period all positions occupied by this Battalion have been subject to attacks by
mortars, rockets and artillery.
Since 15 October 1966 133 gun tubes have been expended with 85,494 rounds fired.
Operation
High Rise total to date: 47,953 rounds
fired.
1st
Section 8th Battalion 26th Artillery was attached for
logistical support and court martial jurisdiction. (Radar guys?)
The
Battalion continues to support from positions on Carroll and Dong Ha, GS to the
3rd Marine Division. Direct
support for the 3rd Force Recon Battalion is provided as directed by
the 12th Marine Regiment.
Mission and
Issues - In order for the Battalion to accomplish assigned tasks, it has been
necessary on a number of occasions for a platoon or firing battery to displace
from Camp JJ Carroll. To date nineteen
displacements have been made to locations as far west as Ca Lu and as far north
as Gio Linh. Nine of these
displacements involved only a platoon, primarily to support deep recon
insertions out of range of the guns at Camp JJ Carroll. The 175mm gun has been highly mobile
provided bridges along the route are Class 30, gaps in the road or terrain do
not exceed 93 inches, and fording depth greater than 42 inches is not
exceeded. It should be noted however,
that when splitting a M107 firing battery into two separate gun groups, certain
problems exist. The TO&E does not
allow for two separate fire direction centers and the problems of coordination
of organizational and direct support, maintenance, ammunition resupply, and
messing of personnel are greatly increased.
Those problems become more acute when key vehicles are deadlined for
mechanical maintenance.
It is
definitely undesirable to displace a platoon to gain a charge 2-range
capability when a battery can accomplish the same mission firing charge 3 from
its original position. What ever may be
gained in tube life is lost in increased support requirements including
material and personnel. Further, the
difference in tube life criteria for charge 2 compared with charge 3 does not
compensate for the problems encountered operating a platoon at extended
distances for the parent battery. All
attempts should be made to maintain the 175mm firing battery integrity.
Direct Fire –
The 175mm Gun is extremely accurate in a direct fire role. The gun has been fired at ranges of 3,000 to
8,000 meters using at different times all three charges with very good results. At Gio Linh, gun crews as a matter of
self-defense, employed direct fire to suppress hostile fire. Direct firing exercises as well as firing on
hostile targets has been accomplished from Camp JJ Carroll. If a gun has been laid, the fire direction
center can provide initial pointing data though it is not necessary. Using TFT’s to obtain the C factor, and the
initial starting elevation, and knowing mil formula, rounds can be adjusted
rapidly and accurately. Direct fire,
using charge 2 has been found to be as effective as charge 3 with the advantage
of saving tube life. The use of direct
fire is important in Vietnam and all deploying units should be proficient in
this area.
HOB- The
Battalion continues to experience some difficulty obtaining the desired height
of burst with the M514A1 Fuze.
Procedures in FM 6-40 paragraph 412 were followed and an experience
factor of rounding down and subtracting 3 seconds is producing the best overall
results. The time of flight scale on
the new GFT AO (Rev II) HEM 437, Ft Sill, appears to be valid. The possibility does exist that the muzzle
velocity of the projectile firing charge 2 or 3 may in some cases; damage the
radio activation unit in the fuze.
Again, the terminal velocity of the projectile, bad fuze lots, or the
angle of fall may be factors contributing to improper functioning. Additional testing of the fuze using charge
2 and charge 3 is in order. (Sounds
like a bad initial shock requirement specification problem at fuze
level.) (Wonder if that fuze was used on other rounds and specified as a fuze
for the 175?) (Charge 1 works and Charge 2 and 3 do not. Almost had to have
been shock not specified at a high enough G rating for the 175mm Gun.)
Armor
shields – When the Battalion was subjected to enemy attacks in the form of
mortars, rockets, and artillery, it was apparent that a need existed for some
type of armor protection. Armor
shielding plates are needed on the side of the M107 to provide fragmentation
protection to personnel and easily damaged gun items such as hydraulic
lines. On many occasions at Gio Linh,
one or more guns would be out of action an attack until damaged hydraulic lines
could be replaced. At times it was
necessary for gun section personnel to suppress hostile fire using direct fire. Armor shields would have afforded some
degree of protection during the counter fire.
In certain daylight attacks when crew were firing a mission, there was
no warning of incoming rounds. From the
time the sound of the weapon was heard firing, until the rounds landed in their
position, personnel had from 1 to 6 seconds to react. Armor shields would have provided some protection. It is recommended that armor shields be
designed for installation on the M107 Gun to provide crew and gun
protection. (Do not think that ever
happened.)
Exercising the M107 – During the reporting period most of the M107 guns
of this Battalion remained in the position for long periods of time and only
moved to have tubes changed or displace when ordered. It was found that fewer chassis maintenance problems developed
after the gun had been driven several miles.
A practice of driving each gun at least 2 miles twice a month was
adopted with subsequent reduction in chassis maintenance problems.
Tubes -
Changing gun tubes on the M-107 is a relatively easy task if all necessary
tools and equipment are available. At
the present time the Ordnance Direct Support team is required to change all gun
tubes. Because of a shortage of
personnel the Battalion Maintenance section frequently assists the support
personnel and are thoroughly familiar and qualified to do the job. If the changing of the M-107 tubes were made
a 2nd Echelon function, support personnel would have additional time
to work on 3rd Echelon repair jobs.
Replacements
– Most of the replacements coming into the Battalion have little or no
experience with the 175-gun system. An
intense and aggressive program of orientation, instruction and on the job
training has been implemented.
Organic Air
Section – The need for an organic air section for each 175 Battalion must be
stressed. The Battalion was authorized
two additional officers to perform the duties of aerial observers. The tactics of the NVA/VC forces and the
terrain encounter justifies the need for aerial observers. Targets of opportunity can be spotted in
many instances only from the air, since in many area it impossible to maintain
patrol bases. During mortar, rocket, or
artillery attacks, an air observer would be an invaluable asset in locating
enemy firing positions. Air observers
could also be dispatched to areas when intelligence sources indicate the
location of NVA/VC forces.
Transportation of the commander or members of his staff to widely
separated units in a shorter period by air increases efficiency and allows
these personnel more time to lend assistant to projects or interest areas. Aircraft would also play an important part
role dint eh transportation of spare parts for deadlined guns or equipment to
widely separated areas. This method of
resupply reduces deadline time and increased operational capabilities. All efforts should be made to secure this
capability.
Casualties
during this period:
Killed in Action – 2 Private First Class John Charles Gainous; C Battery, from Port St Joe, Florida. Private Gainous was killed at Dong Ha. Specialist Duncan Hartwell Fleming; Service Battery, from Stamford, Connecticut. Specialist Fleming was killed at Gio Linh. In addition to the 2 KIA in the reporting period, an original 2/94th member that was infused to the 3/18th Artillery was killed on 24 June 1967. His name is Specialist Jerry Lyne Steed from Gainesville, Texas.
Wounded in
Action – 36
(Private First Class Honkon)(35
Unknown)(26 of the 36 were wounded at Gio Linh.
Non-Battle Casualties – 1
(Unknown)
12 Article 15’s
were issued and 2 Special Courts.
25 Men were
admitted to in-country hospital.
19 Men were
evacuated out of country.
End of notes and discussion, 3rd Battalion Operational Report
On 1 August 1967 at 0940 hours, B Battery departed from Camp JJ Carroll
for Dong Ha. At 1255 hours, C Battery
departed Dong Ha for Camp Carroll. 1420
hours, C Battery arrived Camp Carroll and occupied the B Battery position.
On 1 August 1967, D Battery (B Battery 6/27th) displaced from
Camp Carroll to the Phu Bai Fire Support Base.
The displacement was conducted by motor march from Camp Carroll to Dong
Ha, by LCU from Dong Ha to Hue, and then motor march from Hue to the Fire
Support Base. Both of the land
movements were organized in the standard manner with the M107’s and M113’s
leading followed by heavy to light wheeled vehicles. In addition to organic weapons, three M42’s were provided and
spaced throughout the convoy.
From Hue to the Fire Support Base two M48 Tanks were added and a
reinforced infantry platoon were added. The tanks were positioned at the head
of the convoy and the infantry platoon was positioned immediately behind the
M107’s. The move was completed without
incident. The attached D Battery would
be totally released from I Corps Tactile Zone on 13 September 1967 would leave
I Corps Area of Operation. Returned to
its parent unit of control.
Note by Chronicler: Nothing but good accounts can be found in
researching the 2/94th history representing the B/6/27th that
fought with such valor while it was attached to the 2/94th;
especially during operation High Tower at Gio Linh. It must have been rough on the artillerymen to leave their parent
6th Battalion and travel so far to do battle along side other
batteries of a brand new Battalion.
B/6/27 is the only firing battery that history reveals as
being attached to the 2/94th for such a long duration during its 6-year period. It does reveal that some of the 2/94th
officers and enlisted were assigned to B/6/27 and stayed with the battery and
it is assumed left with the battery. A
"Job Well Done" under the some of the worst conditions and environments. A special thanks goes out to the officers
and enlisted men of B/6/27, October 1966 to 13 September 1967. (End of
note)
D Battery (attached), B Battery 6th Battalion 27th Artillery, would later receive for its actions in the Northern I Corps Area of Operation (particularly the artillery duels at Gio Linh:
Presidential Unit Citation from the Department of the Navy
Meritorious Unit Citation from the Department of the Army
On 2 August 1967, A Battery occupied Cumberland Fire Base and fired the first round into the A Shau Valley, an NVA and VC stronghold. In seven days the battery fired 639 rounds in the A Shau Valley in support of Operation Cumberland.
On 2 August 1967 at 1605 hours received message from A Battery: Arrived
in position, with all guns operational.
The Battalion continued to fire into the Valley and North Vietnam throughout the summer months. Casualties remand surprisingly low considering the number of incoming rounds the Battalion underwent. This was due in part to the poor training of the enemy and the inaccuracy of their weapons. However, it is due in part to the skill and hard work of the personnel of the Battalion.
On 8 August 1967, C Battery displaced to present position. Area formerly occupied by B Battery 6th Battalion 27th Artillery.
C Battery FDC Bunker Floor Plan
(Originally built by D Battery)
On 8 August 1967, A Battery was released from Operation Cumberland.
On 9 August 1967 at 0900 hours A Battery moved from the Cumberland Fire
Support Base (YD620095) to the LCU ramp at Hue. Security for the move consisted of 2 M48 tanks, a reinforced
Marine rifle platoon, and two Marine HU-1D gunships, all from the Third Marine
Division.
The battery commander was convoy commander and maintained communications
with the gunships, tanks, and rifle platoon, as well as organic unit personnel
in the convoy.
Organization for the convoy for security was as follows: The two tanks led the column and were
followed by the convoy commander. Next
came two squads of Infantry in a 21/2-ton truck. The four M107’s, then the M577 and the remaining two squads of
Infantry in a second 21/2-ton truck followed them. The last elements of the convoy were the battery mess,
maintenance, commo, and ammunition sections.
The Battery XO had been sent to Phu Bai on 8 August to organize the
supply and rear detachment of the battery and to coordinate the move by LCU
from Hue to Dong Ha. All arrangements
were made through the 3rd Marine Division G-4. Ample LCU space was made available. With the 11 conex’s that the Battery brought
in addition to the sand bags and other engineer equipment, 5 LCU’s were
required to move the battery. The
Battery moved onto the LCU’s and sailed for Dong Ha at 1600 hours on 9 August
1967.
The battery arrived at Dong Ha LCU ramp at 1100 hours on 10 August. The battery off-loaded and moved to Camp JJ
Carroll, arriving at 1300 hours. There
was no enemy contact during the move.
On 9 August 1967, General Wallace Greene, Commandant of the Marine Corps, paid a visit to the Battalion.
On 10 August 1967 at 1500 hours A Battery arrived in position at Camp JJ
Carroll. Took up position on the west
side of the hill.
This was the first time the original 2/94th Battalion (A, B,
& C Batteries) had been together since landing in October of 1966. (See earlier A Battery assignments.)
On 14 August 1967, GS18 Mr. Browing of Naval Ordnance paid the
Battalion
a visit.
On 17 August 1967, C Battery displaced two guns to the Rockpile.
Account from Lieutenant Doug Beard, summer of 67 at Camp JJ Carroll: I was working Battalion FDC and went outside for a breath of fresh air about midnight. I was watching our meteorological section launch the midnight weather balloon that they were going to track on radar. About that time their generator ran out of gas and lights and radar went off. A few seconds later a large explosion happened just outside the wire on the South edge of camp. This was strange because most large incoming came from the north. Next morning we did a crater analysis and came up with several pieces with English writing on them. A few days later, we learned that an Air Force "Wild Weasel" reported knocking out an "enemy" radar site in the DMZ at precisely that time. Another few drops of gas in that generator, and our weather section would have been history. (End of account)
Account from Lieutenant Doug Meredith, A Battery FO, regarding the above incident:
On 24 August 1967; as of noon, C Battery had fired 35,279 rounds.
On 25 August 1967 at 1710 hours, C Battery, Gun #? fired the Battalion's 100,000th round in country in support of the 3rd Marine Division. The Battalion Commander and staff fired the 100,000th round.
Gun Crew of C Battery Gun #? holding 100,000th round
Battalion Commander and Staff firing 100,00th Round
On 30 August 1967, Camp JJ Carroll received 40 rounds of 102mm spin
rockets; two landing in the C Battery area causing minor damage and no
personnel casualties.
On or about 1 September 1967 the Ammunition Supply Point at Dong Ha was
destroyed as a result of a artillery/rocket attack.
On 2, 3 and 5 September 1967, Camp JJ Carroll received incoming enemy artillery fire, totaling 18 rounds. There was no damage, nor were there any casualties.
On 2 September 1967, Camp JJ Carroll received 5 rounds of 152mm artillery
none landing in the C Battery area.
On 7-9 September 1967, Camp JJ Carroll received 56 rounds of 102mm spin
rockets, two landing in the C Battery area causing no damage or casualties.
On 10 September 1967, Camp Carroll received 21 rounds of 152mm artillery,
none landing in the C Battery area.
On 12 September 1967, the Rockpile received 30 rounds of 82mm mortar
causing no damage to C Battery equipment or personnel in the area.
On 13 September 1967, D Battery (B Battery 6th Battalion 27th
Artillery) at the Phu Bai Support Base departed the I Corps Tactical Zone and
reverted to the control of their parent organization in II Corps. No details of this move are recorded. (Thanks guys, JOB WELL DONE!)
On 12 and 13 September 1967, Camp Carroll received 10 rounds of 152mm
artillery, none landing in the C Battery area.
On 18 September 1967 at 0845 hours, the Battalion lost 12 officers, which
left on scheduled DEROS.
On 18 September 1967, Major General Brown, Commandant USAAMS, paid the Battalion a visit.
On 20 September 1967, two C Battery guns returned from the Rockpile.
On 20 September 1967, the Battalion Post Exchange was opened. Serving more than 2,000 men including the Marines in the area.
On 22 September 1967, General William Westmoreland, COMUSMACV, visited the Battalion and was escorted through the Battalion area by the Battalion Commander. General Westmoreland visited Battalion FDC, Metro section, B Battery FDC, and one gun section in B Battery. General Westmoreland departed the area apparently pleased with what he had observed.
On 24 September 1967, Camp JJ Carroll received 42 rounds of 102mm spin
rockets; two rounds landing in the C Battery area causing minor damage and no
personnel casualties.
C Battery Personnel Assignment and Duty Changes:
Battery Commander
01 July to 18 Sep 1967 CPT
Chancey K. McCord
18 Sep to 23 Sep 1967 1st
LT Andrew Tenis
23 Sep to 30 Sep 1967 CPT
William B. Durkin
XO
01 July to 18 Sep 1967 1st
LT Andrew Tenis
18 Sep to 30 Sep 1967 1st
LT David N. Sandeen
FDO
01 July to 30 Sep 1967 1st LT Gregory T. Smith
18 Sep to 30 Sep 1967 1st
LT Harry E. Taylor
1st SGT
01 July to 16 Sep 1967 1st SGT Edward N. Bryan
17 Sep to 30 Sep 1967 1st SGT Jack E. Hobgood
Signed by Captain, Arty, Commanding
William
B. Durkin
In October of 1967 a breechblock exploded wounding two personnel. (Battery and personnel are unknown at this time.) (Possible A Battery.)
On 16 October
1967 the Commanding General of the 196th LIB, Brigadier General Lindell, paid a
visit to the Battalion.
On 20 October 1967 at 1705 hours, Major Fleming arrived in Battalion area
to assume the duties of the Battalion S3.
Note: Later Captain Erickson, B Battery CO, and Major Fleming, S3, would develop a procedure for locating 130 Artillery within 200 Meters. (Details are unknown at this time)
On October 24
1967, Battalion Award Ceremony, C Battery personnel received one Army
Commendation Medal: First Sergeant Hobgood and four Purple Hearts: Specialist Duke, Funk, Gann and McGill.
Notes and discussion from 1 Aug 1967 to 31 Oct 1967, 4th
Battalion
Operational Report
Mission assignments: Provide GS for the 3rd Marine Division. Direct support for the patrols of the 3rd Marine Recon Battalion is provided as directed by the 12th Marine Regiment. In addition, supporting fires for Khe Sanh Special Forces camp can be provided as required. A Battery now provides GS for the 3rd Marine Division in the vicinity of Hue and Phu Bai area.
Gun Pads – Gun
pads, made of wood and installed in March of 1967, have become completely
rotted to the point of uselessness. One
pad has been replaced with concrete on an experimental basis. Its suitability will be reported at next
quarterly report.
Preparation
for the Northeast monsoon and approaching winter season has begun.
Sandbags as
they deteriorate are being replaced with powder canisters filled with sand.
Met
conditions for the most part were favorable for military operations. The exception was during the latter part of
September 20 inches of rain fell in five days causing extensive erosion.
During the
quarter an additional 80 tubes were expended bringing the total since Oct of
1966 to 213 tubes.
During the
quarter an additional 39,737 rounds were fired in support of Operations High
Rise, Kingfisher, Ardmore, and Cumberland.
Artillery
Mechanic – This Battalion has had no school trained artillery mechanic in the
past 12 months. This individual is a
vital link in the maintenance chain.
The amount of work involved and the importance of the work demands this
grade structure be authorized grade of E5.
It is highly recommended that the school for artillery mechanic be
re-instituted at Fort Sill and be authorized to grade E5.
In Country
Anniversary – During the year in Vietnam 213 gun tubes have been expended and
over 120,000 rounds have been fired.
The majority of the rounds have been charge 3, which far exceeds any
175mm gun Battalion in the world to date.
In the past 60 days a marked increase in the number of major and minor
component replacement has become necessary.
It appears the weapons of this Battalion may have reached a point where
a major rebuild is in order, rather than continuous repair and replacement of
components.
Since the
destruction of the Ammo Supply Point in Dong Ha distribution of ammunition has
been confused and has become critical. Ammunition and propellants were loaded
at Da Nang to be shipped without regard of lot number. IN addition the critical resupply has caused
a drastic increase in the demands of the 5-ton trucks. 100% overloads have been normal on a
day-to-day basis. With the road
conditions and the overloads severe shortage of 5-ton tires and tubes has been
chronic the past 60 days. Arrival of
the M548 cargo carriers has partially improved the situation. However this vehicle is not designed to carry
heavy loads over a long distance.
The opening
of QL1 from Da Nang to Dong Ha has not yet benefited Army units in this area.
ADCON
changes were the release of B/6/27 and the reassignment of A Battery back to the
2/94th. The remainder of
the Battalion: Headquarters, A, B, and
C Batteries are located on Camp Carroll.
Service Battery, minus Battalion maintenance and Battalion personnel
section, which are attached to Headquarters and located on Carroll, remain at
Dong Ha.
Infusion program - The infusion program can be
considered effective regarding the lower ranks and grades. However no consideration was given to the
Officers and Senior NCO’s. The entire
original officer strength departed in a three and one half week time
frame. With the exception of one
Captain that extended for two months, one Captain that arrived in late July,
and two Lieutenants who extended their tours for 6 months. Four junior officers were transferred in
from the 8/4th but they were new in country and could contribute
little to an orderly transition.
Replacements had no overlap time and in some cases positions were vacant
for weeks.
In addition
between 14 August and 20 September the Sergeant Major, 4 First Sergeants, the
Operations Sergeant, the Intelligence Sergeant, the Commo Chief, the Fire
Direction Chief, and numerous E-6 Section Chiefs all departed the Battalion.
Although all
replacements quickly accepted the responsibilities placed on them, this lack of
planning had a definite adverse effect on the combat efficiency of this
Battalion.
Casualties
during this period:
Killed in
Action – 0
Wounded in
Action – 5 (assumed to be
Specialist Duke, Funk, Gann and McGill)(1 Unknown)
Non-Battle
Casualties – 0
23 Article
15’s were issued, 1 Special Court, and 1 General Court.
20 Men were
admitted to in-country hospital.
15 Men were
evacuated.
3 cases of
Malaria
End of notes and discussion, 4th Battalion Operational Report
On 1 November 1967, 2/94th Battalion was released from 1st Field Force (Forward) at Dong Ha and assigned to the 108th Arty Group at Dong Ha.
The 108th Group assumed the all of the operational functions
or the 1st Field Forces Artillery (Forward). (The mission of the
108th command post is to act as an extension of HQ, 1st Field Forces
Artillery to monitor administrative and logistical support provided by the III
MAF, HQ, 1st Field Forces, and 1st Logistical Command.
OPCON of the Army units is under III Marine Amphibious Force.)
On 1 November 1967 the 108th Group formally assumed
duties. The 108th Group
Headquarters and all subordinate units were under operational control of the
III Marine Amphibious Group, which in turn turned over operational control to
the 3rd Marine Division.
(Except Battery B, 8th Battalion 4th Artillery and
Battery G, 29th Artillery.
These units were OPCON to the 1st Marine Division.) The Third
Marine Division in turn passed operational control of all remaining group
elements, except 1st Battalion 44th Artillery, to the 12th
Marine Regiment.
On 10 November 1967, C Battery gun #1 evacuated for cracked turret.
On 18 November 1967 C Battery used
a new concrete gun pad for the first time. The Battery had constructed a
concrete gun pad to replace the rapidly deteriorating wooden pad of the 3rd
Gun Section. Too date; approximately
600 rounds have been fired from the new pad with no adverse effects to the
gun. The new pad eliminates the
requirement to pull the gun off the pad to re-lay, greatly facilitating laying. Succeeding pads can be improved by reducing
the size, approximately a 13-foot radius circular, 26 feet across
octagonal.
Making it a monolithic pour
and building the pad at/or below ground level.
On 21 November 1967, C Battery was read Article 31 USMJ at formation and
informed that a shakedown inspection was to be conducted for narcotics
(marijuana, whiskey, and personal weapons).
Approximately six bottles of whiskey were confiscated. The Battalion Commander directed the
inspection.
On 21 November 1967, C Battery received a ‘float’ gun for gun #1
mentioned above.
On 24 November 1967, a platoon displaced to the Rockpile. Gun #3 and “float” relieved the platoon of B
Battery of its commitment. Security was
adequate. However, no air cover was provided.
On 24 November 1967 at 1400 hours, B Battery returned from the Rockpile.
On 27 November 196, C Battery – 1st LT Jeffrey F. Newton was assigned
TDY as FO.
Account from
Lester
Modelowitz, Service Battery, who was involved
with running convoys along the DMZ: November 1967, we had a convoy heading towards
Carroll from Dong Ha when one of the ration trucks hit a land mine. I was about 2 miles behind in a Diesel Fuel
Truck. Private First Class Meryl Williams or Ozzie was
driving. We heard the explosion and had
to stop. Macfarlane and Innacone got
out of the damaged truck but with no weapons and hid in the bush. Besides the normal B rations the truck was
carrying chicken parts and steak. The
Marine patrol that arrived must have thought the worst with all the meat
remains scattered all over. Macfarlane
and Innacone were relieved that the US Marines had found them. (End of
account)
There were some 2/94th artillery pieces located at the remote
Rockpile XD 979-559 with the 3rd Battalion 9th Marine Regiment. It is known that that the ‘Bodacious
Bastard’ B Battery, 2nd gun section, (red section) was at the Rockpile for a
short while in November of 1967.
This is the same gun that has the picture taken on Carroll with the
Buccaneer sign. The Buccaneer Mission Statement was:
"THE MISSION OF THIS
SECTION,
IS DESIGNED TO GIVE THE
ENEMY SOLDIER
THE GREATEST
OPPORTUNITY
TO GIVE HIS LIFE FOR HIS COUNTRY”
On 9 December 1967, SP4 Curtis
R. Dowling was wounded while serving as RECON SGT with a forward observer party
on search and destroy operation vicinity coordinates YD1975.
On 9 December 1967 at 0300 hours, incidents in A Battery with a breech
ring blown up. No injuries.
On 9 December 1967 at 0800 hours the Battalion Headquarters moved into a
new command bunker. (It was
the ‘Bunker Ma Hall’ of the Bunkers on Carroll)
On 12 December 1967 at 1500
hours, an M548 hit a mine on return trip from D5. The vehicle was a total loss with one minor injury. While retrieving the M548, one man hung his
ring finger and tore finger off.
Soldier is unknown at this time.
On 23 December 1967 at 1515 hours, General Johnson, Army Chief of Staff,
visited the Battalion. B Battery fired
‘Battery Fire’ on Operation High Rise for him.
Lieutenant Colonel Kamstra escorted General Johnson through the Battery area. At 1540 hours, General Johnson departed the
area via helicopter.
On 23 December 1967, General Harold K. Johnson visited C Battery and
extended Christmas and New Years Greetings to the personnel.
On 24 December 1967, C Battery platoon with Gun #3 and ‘float’ returned
from the Rockpile, having been relieved by a platoon from A Battery.
On 24 December 1967, Christmas Eve at 1800 hours, a 24-hour truce began and will last until 1800 hours 25 December 1967. At 2030 hours, Marine COC reported possible rocket attack. All personnel were required to get in a bunker – all organized activities were postponed. At 2057, the Marine COC reports All Clear – Alert Cancelled! Camp JJ Carroll remained on a 50% alert status.
On 26 December 1967, Major General Tompkins, Commanding General 3rd
Marine Division, visited the Battalion.
On 27 December 1967, at a
Battalion Awards Ceremony, C Battery personnel received one Silver Star: Staff Sergeant Cornett, one Army Commendation
Medal:
Staff Sergeant Pugh, and one Purple Heart: Specialist Bachtell.
On 31 December 1967 at 1800 hours, a 36-hour truce began. Truce will last until 0600 hours 2 Jan 1968.
C Battery
Personnel Assignment and Duty Changes:
Battery Commander
01 Oct to 31 Dec 1967 Captain William B. Durkin.
XO
01 Oct to 31 Dec 1967 Lieutenant David E. Sandeen
Asst XO
01 Oct to 13 Oct 1967 Lieutenant Harry E. Taylor
13 Oct to 31 Dec 1967 Lieutenant Felix J. Muller
FO
03 Oct to 13 Oct 1967 Lieutenant Felix J. Muller
22 Oct to 31 Dec 1967 Lieutenant Robert D. Fautsch
02 Oct to 31 Dec 1967 Lieutenant Robert A. Delap
27 Nov to 31 Dec 1967 Lieutenant Jeffrey F. Newton
First Sergeant
01 Oct to 31 Dec 1967 First Sergeant Jack E. Hobgood
Analysis
C Battery lost all its key personnel during the months of September and
October of 1967, 90% of its NCO’s and 100% of its Officers, and therefore was
in a rebuilding process during the early part of the quarter. By mid-November the ‘New’ C Battery had
jelled into a well-rounded and professional artillery unit. A high state of professionalism has been
maintained to date.
Signed by William B Durkin,
Captain, Arty, Commanding.
Report from C Battery to
Battalion Commander, 1968
Welfare and Morale
a. R&R –how many enlisted men have gone to
Hawaii 6, Bangkok 3, Taipei 2, Pennang 1, Hong Kong 5, Australia 5, Tokyo 1 and
2 to Manila.
b. Church Services: both Protestant and Catholic services held weekly within the
Battery.
c. PX Facilities: good
d. Entertainment: extremely limited
e. Morale:
excellent
f. Disciplinary Actions: one Special Court, two
Article 15s
g. Mail Service: generally good
h. Magazines and Paper Back Books: received periodically from Special Services
Administrative and Logistics
a. The lack of senior NCO strength has become a
pressing problem.
b. The supply system is still lagging behind
the demand.
c.
Classified ammo has improved but broken lots still remain a problem.
d.
Communications
b.
There still exists a requirement for an intercom system and a waterproof
phone within the firing battery.
c.
Maintenance
a. Command emphasis on the gradual input of
parts and on the mandatory maintenance period has improved the readiness
posture.
b.
It is felt that more support maintenance and personnel with greater
technical proficiency are needed.
c.
Fire Direction
a. The use of the Computer’s Record for such
mission has become apparent and the color-coding on the charge on the
Recorder’s Sheet has been established as a precautionary measure.
b. The M18 Fire Direction Computer has proved a
most accurate and reliable asset.
Personnel Changes
On 27 November 1967, Lieutenant Jeffrey F. Newton was assigned TDY as
FO.
On 28 January 1968, Lieutenant Felix J. Muller was
reassigned to Service Battery. Lieutenant Robert A. Delay replaced him as Asst XO
Recommended
Additions to TOE
1.
One SSG Chief Computer 13E40
3. Two Chart Operators 13E20
4. One Sergeant Gunner 13B40
5. Four Cannoneers 13A10
6.